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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
In this case, we are asked to review a decision of the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands, reversing in part an order of the Virgin Islands 
Territorial Court and remanding for further proceedings. 
The appellate division's decision involves complicated 
questions about the scope and application of the Virgin 
Islands homestead exemption and the procedures available 
for undoing a confirmation order of a judgment sale. See 5 
V.I.C. S 478, 489. We will not address the merits of this 
appeal, however, because we do not believe the decision, 
which remanded the case to the territorial court for further 
proceedings on the merits, qualifies as a "final decision" 




In 1989, Sylvia Dodge, the appellant in this case, lost an 
action brought by Edwin Ortiz to collect a debt. Ortiz 
obtained a judgment in territorial court against Dodge for 
the amount of $4,982.91, plus interests and costs. 
 
Ortiz did not succeed in two attempts to collect on the 
judgment. A territorial marshal then issued a writ, 
attaching Dodge's property at 122 Estate Ruby, St. Croix. 
The marshal eventually conducted an execution sale, and 
the property was purchased by Santiago Camacho, the 
intervenor appellee in this case, for a bid of $9,300. The 
territorial court entered an order confirming the sale of 
Dodge's property on September 24, 1991. Dodge apparently 
 




did not receive a copy of Camacho's motion to confirm the 
judgment sale. 
 
Nearly one year later, Dodge filed a motion with the 
territorial court to annul the Confirmation Order and set 
aside the sale on the grounds that she had been improperly 
denied a homestead exemption prior to the sale of her 
property and that she had been given improper notice of 
the motion to enter a confirmation order of that sale. See 5 
V.I.C. S 478.1 The territorial court agreed with Dodge, 
vacated the confirmation order, and set aside the sale. 
 
Camacho appealed to Appellate Division of the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands. See 48 U.S.C. S 1613a. On 
appeal, Camacho argued that (1) Dodge had failed t o 
provide appropriate notice to the marshals that her 
property qualified for the homestead exemption; (2) even if 
Dodge was entitled to the homestead exemption, it 
protected, at most, only her equity in the property, which 
was less than the amount paid out by Camacho; and 
(3) Dodge failed to meet the standards of Rule 60(b) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in bringing her motion to 
annul the confirmation and vacate the sale and 
confirmation order. 
 
The appellate division affirmed the territorial court's 
decision to annul the Confirmation Order, but it did so 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil  
Procedure,2 rather than pursuant to 5 V.I.C. S 489, which 
sets forth the circumstances under Virgin Islands law for 
confirmation of a judgment sale.3 See Camacho v. Dodge, 
947 F.Supp. 886, 894 (D. Virgin Islands 1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 5 V.I.C. S 478(a) provides in pertinent part: "The homestead of any 
family, or the proceeds thereof, shall be exempt from judicial sale for 
the 
satisfaction of any liability hereafter contracted or for the satisfaction 
of 
any judgment hereafter obtained on such debt. . . . It shall not exceed 
thirty thousand dollars in value . . .." 
 
2. Under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may 
relieve a party from a final judgment or order under certain 
circumstances, such as "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect" or "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment." 
 
3. Section 489 provides in pertinent part: "The plaintiff in the writ of 
execution shall be entitled, on motion therefor, to have an order 
confirming the sale, unless the judgment debtor, or his representative in 
case of his death, files with the clerk his objections thereto within five 
days after the return thereof." 5 V.I.C. S 489. 
 




Although the appellate division affirmed the territorial 
court's annulment of the Confirmation Order, it did not 
uphold the territorial court's decision to set aside the 
judgment sale. According to the appellate division, the fact 
that Dodge had properly invoked her homestead exemption 
under Virgin Islands law did not resolve the question of 
whether the sale should be set aside. See Camacho, 947 
F.Supp. at 893. The appellate division therefore remanded 
the case to the territorial court to give Dodge "the 
opportunity to have the extent of her entitlement to the 
homestead exemption determined by the trial court . . .. 
The court's ruling on the remanded homestead issue will 
determine whether or not the entire execution sale must be 
set aside." Id. 
 
Dodge's attorney now appeals the appellate division's 
reversal of the territorial court's decision to set aside the 
judgment sale.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 4. We refer to Dodge's attorney because Ms. Dodge is no longer alive. 
Although, the appellate division directed Dodge's attorney to substitute 
a party for Sylvia Dodge, pursuant to Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, no later than June 25, 1996, the record reflects 
that Dodge's attorney failed to accomplish this task. On June 26, 1996, 
Dodge's attorney, Lolita d'Jones de Paiewonsky, filed a response, 
suggesting that the trustee of Ms. Dodge's bankruptcy estate (Dodge had 
formerly filed for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for 
the Virgin Islands), John Ellis, would continue as a party to the 
proceedings. Ellis, however, later signed an affidavit in which he stated 
that he had never been asked to act as a substitute party in these 
proceedings and would refuse to do so if asked. 
 
Paiewonsky also stated in her Response to the appellate division that 
Dodge's heir, Keith Dodge, would be returning to the Virgin Islands and 
would be seeking counsel to probate his mother's estate, which 
presumably included the exempt portion of her homestead property. 
Paiewonsky did not submit any further evidence, however, that Keith 
Dodge had in fact initiated probate proceedings. 
 
At oral argument, we questioned Dodge's attorney about her failure to 
effect a proper substitution, in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure Rule 43(a). Dodge's attorney replied in writing that Dodge's 
agent, Bassilia Chase, would continue in Dodge's place and would be 
handling "any probate proceeding as would be necessary." To date, we 
have not received any copy of any probate proceeding commenced with 
the territorial court. 
 






A. Final Decision 
 
We need not address the merits of Dodge's appeal 
because we lack appellate jurisdiction over this case. Under 
28 U.S.C. S 1291 and 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(c), our jurisdiction 
is limited to "final decisions" from the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands.5 See In re A.M., 34 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 
1994). A final order is one that "ends the litigation on the 
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute 
the judgment." Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 
65 S.Ct. 631, 633 (1945). See also Coopers & Lybrand v. 
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457 (1978); 
Bryant v. Sylvester, 57 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
Neither of the parties has addressed whether the decision 
of the appellate division of the district court constitutes a 
final decision within the meaning of S 1291 or S 1613a. 
Because we are a court of limited jurisdiction, however, we 
must resolve this threshold issue sua sponte. See FW/PBS, 
Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607-08 
(1990). We cannot treat a non-final order as immediately 
appealable simply because we think it might be erroneous 
and might wish to expedite resolution of the case. See 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 378, 
101 S.Ct. 669, 675 (1981). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Camacho contends that we should dismiss this appeal on the ground 
that Dodge's attorney failed to substitute a proper party to continue the 
appeal. Although we are inclined to agree, we will not address the merits 
of this argument since we find that we lack jurisdiction to review the 
appellate division's decision. 
 
5. 48 U.S.C. S 1613a(c) states: "The United Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction of appeals from allfinal decisions of the 
district court on appeal from the courts established by local law." 
 
Appellate jurisdiction is also defined at 28 U.S.C. S 1291, which 
provides: "The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals 
from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . 
and 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where direct review may 
be had in the Supreme Court." 
 




This case presents a complicated jurisdictional question 
because the case has already received "appellate" review 
from the district court. In this jurisdictional scheme of a 
court of appeals reviewing the decision of a territorial 
district court, acting in its appellate capacity, the Ninth 
Circuit has elected to treat the court of appeals' position as 
analogous to that of the Supreme Court when a party 
petitions for certiorari from a judgment of the highest court 
of a state. See e.g. Guam v. Kingsbury, 649 F.2d 740, 742 
(9th Cir. 1981) (comparing appellate review of decisions of 
district court of Guam to Supreme Court's review of 
judgments of highest state court); Guam v. Quinata, 704 
F.2d 1085, 1086 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting imperfectfit of 
analogy). In In re Alison, 837 F.2d 619, 622 (3d Cir. 1988), 
however, we rejected this analogy as inconsistent with the 
language and spirit of S 1613a(c), the statute governing 
appeals from the Territorial Court and the District Court of 
the Virgin Islands, and we refused to accept an 
"interlocutory appeal" of a reversal of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal. See In re Alison, 837 F.2d at 622 (rejecting 
argument that Court of Appeals is functional equivalent of 
Supreme Court under Virgin Islands judicial scheme). 
Subsequently, with regard to the question of finality, we 
have treated appeals from the Appellate Division of the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands no differently than 
appeals taken from any other federal district court. See e.g. 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Blake, 1997 WL 371031, *2 
(3d Cir. 1997); In re A.M., 34 F.3d at 155. 
 
In this case, the appellate division affirmed the territorial 
court's determination that Sylvia Dodge had triggered her 
homestead exemption under Virgin Islands law and that 
she was entitled to have the Confirmation Order annulled, 
but the court remanded the case to the territorial court to 
determine the exact extent of Dodge's exemption. In a 
footnote, the appellate division explained: 
 
       Without getting into the details of the statute and 
       procedure for claiming premises as a homestead 
       entitled to the exemption, we note that the homestead 
       "shall not exceed thirty thousand dollars in value." 5 
       V.I.C. S 478(a). We further point out that Dodge had 
       claimed in her bankruptcy filings that the property had 
 




       a value of $50,000 although this claim was not 
       contemporaneous with the judicial sale. 
 
Camacho, 947 F.Supp. at 893 n.12. We infer from this 
statement that the appellate division remanded the case to 
the territorial court to allow it to hear evidence regarding 
the value of Dodge's equitable interest in her homestead, 
since the value of Dodge's home had not been made a part 
of the record.6 The appellate division's decision cannot, 
therefore, be described as a "final decision." The 
proceedings in this case are ongoing, and the merits -- 
whether Dodge is entitled to have the court set aside her 
judgment sale -- have not yet been conclusively 
determined. As the appellate division explained, "The 
[territorial] court's ruling on the remanded homestead issue 
will determine whether or not the entire execution sale must 
be set aside." Camacho, 947 F.Supp. at 893 (emphasis 
added). The operative word in this sentence is "will." 
Clearly, the appellate division did not "finally resolve" the 
question whether the execution sale should be set aside. 
 
Moreover, by remanding this case, the appellate division 
handed to the territorial court the onerous task of 
determining the value of Sylvia Dodge's exemption. Since 
the territorial court's role is hardly ministerial, we cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We also assume that the appellate division had accepted Camacho's 
argument, set forth in his brief on appeal, that the homestead exemption 
protected only the homeowner's equitable interest from judicial sale. 
Although the territorial court has not addressed this issue, most states 
have treated their homestead exemption as protecting only the debtor's 
equitable interest in the property. "[E]very modern [court] decision . . . 
adopts the view that the homestead amount is part of the homeowner's 
equity and not part of the value subject to the mortgage." Mercier v. 
Partlow, 546 A.2d 787, 789 (Vt. 1988) (citing cases). 
 
The record reflects that Dodge had two mortgages on her home, 
amounting to $40,000 without interest. Although Dodge had listed her 
property at $50,000 in her bankruptcy filings, that claim was not made 
at the time of the judicial sale. Since the value of Dodge's home at the 
time of the judgment sale was unknown, we think it quite reasonable 
that the appellate division would remand the issue to the territorial 
court 
to determine: (1) the value of Dodge's property, and (2) the difference, 
if 
any, between the value of the unencumbered portion of the property and 
the proceeds left over for Ms. Dodge after Ortiz's debt was satisfied. 
 




characterize the appellate division's decision as "final." See 
Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1259 (3d Cir. 1995) (order 
generally not final "until it is reduced to a determinate 
amount"); Isidor Paiewonsky Associates, Inc. v. Sharp 
Properties, Inc., 998 F.2d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1993) (final 
judgment is "one which disposes of the whole subject, gives 
all the relief that was contemplated, provides with 
reasonable completeness for giving effect to the judgment 
and leaves nothing to be done in the cause save to 
superintend, ministerially, the execution of the decree") 
(citation omitted). 
 
Because the appellate division's decision is not final, we 
cannot consider any of the issues raised on appeal unless 
they fall within the collateral order doctrine. See Cohen v. 
Beneficial Indus. Loan Co., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221 
(1949). Under that doctrine, an appellate court may review 
a non-final order if the order conclusively and finally 
resolves a disputed question, raises an important issue 
distinct from the merits of the case, and is effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. See Christy v. 
Horn, 115 F.3d 201, 203 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Ford Motor 
Co., 110 F.3d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
To determine whether the collateral order doctrine 
applies, we must examine the grounds for Dodge's appeal. 
She objects to two aspects of the appellate division's 
decision. First, she contends that it was improper to affirm 
the territorial court's annulment of the confirmation on the 
basis of Rule 60(b), as opposed to 5 V.I.C. S 489.7 Second, 
Dodge challenges the decision as erroneous because it 
vacates the territorial court's set aside of the judgment sale. 
Neither of these results falls within the collateral order 
exception to the final judgment rule. First, the appellate 
division did not conclusively resolve the issue whether the 
judgment sale of Dodge's property should be set aside. To 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Since regardless whether the appellate division chose to affirm the 
territorial court's annulment of the confirmation under Rule 60(b) or 
under 5 V.I.C. S 489, the court would have had to remand the case to 
the territorial court to determine the value of Dodge's exemption under 
5 V.I.C. S 478, we question how Dodge has been prejudiced by the 
holding that Rule 60(b), not 5 V.I.C. S 489, provides the grounds for 
annulling the Confirmation Order. 
 




the contrary, the appellate division deliberately left this 
issue open by remanding the case to the territorial court to 
determine the monetary value, if any, of Dodge's exemption. 
See Camacho, 947 F.Supp. at 893. 
 
Second, both of the issues raised by Dodge's appeal -- 
the decision not to vacate the judgment sale and the 
affirmance of the territorial court's annulment of the 
Confirmation Order on alternative grounds -- are clearly 
intertwined with the merits of this case. This case thus 
differs from those situations in which the parties have 
appealed a separable issue, not related to the merits, such 
as a jurisdictional or procedural question.8 See e.g. Christy, 
115 F.3d at 206 (district court's stay of habeas petition 
unrelated to merits of prisoner's claim for relief); In re Ford, 
110 F.3d at 958 (privilege and work product issues 
unrelated to merits of case). 
 
Finally, we fail to see why Dodge cannot wait to attack 
the appellate division's decision until after the territorial 
court has decided the value of her exemption. Indeed, given 
the complex nature of the merits of this case, we think we 
would be in a better position to judge the merits of Dodge's 
appeal if the value (or lack thereof) of Dodge's exemption 
were part of the record. In sum, this case demonstrates the 
reason why the final decision rule exists in thefirst place: 
it preserves judicial efficiency by preventing piecemeal 
appeals on issues that are better reviewed in the context of 
a final judgment. See Bethel v. McAllister Bros., Inc., 81 
F.3d 376, 381 (3d Cir. 1996) (final judgment rule premised 
on policy against piecemeal appeals), citing Carr v. American 
Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 1994), and Praxis 
Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Savings Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 54 
n.5 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
The appellate division's decision is neither final nor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because we do not find the issues raised by Dodge's appeal to be 
sufficiently separate from the merits of the case, we do not consider 
whether they would meet the "importance test" under the collateral order 
doctrine. See Christy, 115 F.3d at 205. 
 




collaterally final. We therefore lack appellate jurisdiction 
over this appeal.9 
 
B. Substitution of Parties 
 
Although we dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction, we nevertheless take this opportunity to 
express our concern that Dodge's attorney has failed to 
substitute a proper party for Ms. Dodge following her death. 
Sylvia Dodge's death was first noticed on the record by the 
appellate division on May 7, 1996, when it ordered Dodge's 
attorney to inform the court of Dodge's status, and if 
necessary, to request substitution of an appropriate party 
no later than June 25, 1996, pursuant to Rule 43(a) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.10  Dodge's attorney did 
not obey this order.11 Instead, she unsuccessfully attempted 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Camacho also contends in his brief that the appellate division 
committed error by affirming the territorial court's annulment of the 
Confirmation Order. Whereas Dodge claims that the appellate division 
reached the right result (at least as regards upholding the territorial 
court's annulment of the Confirmation Order) for the wrong reasons, 
Camacho contends that the appellate division reached the wrong result, 
period. However, because Camacho failed to file a cross-appeal, we need 
not consider his argument. "As a general rule a party aggrieved by a 
decision of the district court must file an appeal in order to receive 
relief 
from the decision." United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 
335, 342 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
10. Rule 43(a) provides in pertinent part: "If a party dies after a notice 
of 
appeal is filed or while a proceeding is otherwise pending in the court of 
appeals, the personal representative of the deceased party may be 
substituted as a party on motion filed by the representative . . . . If 
the 
deceased party has no representative, any party may suggest the death 
on the record and proceedings shall then be had as the court of appeals 
may direct. . . . If a party entitled to appeal shall die before filing a 
notice 
of appeal, the notice of appeal may be filed by that party's personal 
representative, or if there is not personal representative by that party's 
attorney of record within the time prescribed by these rules. After the 
notice of appeal is filed substitution shall be effected in the court 
appeals 
in accordance with this subdivision." 
 
The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure have been adopted by the 
Appellate Division of the District Court of the Virgin Islands. See Rule 
76.1 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure ("LRCi"). 
 
11. Dodge's attorney contends that the appellate division never "ordered" 
her to file for substitution. We disagree. The Appellate Division's 
 




to substitute John Ellis, the trustee of Dodge's bankruptcy 
estate. In the alternative, Dodge's attorney argued that 
substitution was not necessary under federal Bankruptcy 
Rule 1016, which allows a liquidation case under Chapter 
7 of the Bankruptcy Code to continue despite the death of 
a debtor. We think it is quite clear that the Bankruptcy 
Rules have no bearing on the question of whether this court 
or the appellate division may exercise jurisdiction over this 
case. 
 
Despite this earlier order, however, the appellate division 
apparently overlooked its own directive when it filed its 
decision in November, 1996. The court did, however, state 
its expectation that the territorial court would ensure that 
Dodge's attorney substitute a proper representative. See 
Camacho, 947 F.Supp. at 893 n.12. Nevertheless, when we 
heard this appeal, proper substitution still had not taken 
place. After oral argument, Dodge's attorney wrote us a 
letter, stating that Bassilia Chase, Dodge's agent, had 
initiated probate proceedings before the territorial court and 
should be substituted as a party to this appeal. To date, we 
have not received any certification or other document 
confirming this information. 
 
Regardless of whether Dodge's attorney has failed to 
comply with Rule 43(a), we think it is quite clear that, at 
some point, the failure to substitute a proper party for a 
deceased appellant moots the case. Under Article III, our 
jurisdiction, and that of the courts below, is limited to 
cases and controversies. We fail to see how any live case or 
controversy can exist when a deceased appellant has not 
been replaced with a legal representative. We decline, 
however, to address this issue until we are certain that 
substitution has not occurred. Because we are already 
dismissing this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, we 
will save this issue for the Territorial Court to resolve. We 
will assume for now that Ms. Chase is a properly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 Amended Order expressly states that "counsel for appellee shall inform 
this Court of appellee's status, and if necessary, request appropriate 
relief pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 43(a) no later than June 25, 1996." We 
interpret this statement to be an order, not an invitation, to substitute 
a proper party for Ms. Dodge. 
 




substituted party. See Bennett v. Tucker, 827 F.2d 63, 68 
(7th Cir. 1987) (temporarily substituting decedent's 
daughter as plaintiff in Section 1983 action, pending state 
probate court's appointment of her as executor of her 
mother's estate). If, it should occur, however, Ms. Chase is 
not eventually appointed as legal representative of Sylvia 
Dodge's estate, the territorial court will have to take 




Because we lack jurisdiction to review the appellate 
division's non-final decision, we will dismiss Dodge's 
appeal. Accordingly, we will remand this case to the district 
court for remand to the territorial court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
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